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“On-line Privacy: behaviour, paradox and the law” 
Dr Lisa Collingwood1 
Introduction 
Privacy is historically not a well-protected or well-recognised concept in English law2. 
However, with the passing of The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which effectively 
incorporated the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) into UK law, our citizens are entitled to have their rights 
enforced and protected to the degree that the Act allows.  As Warby et al rightly articulate, 
the significance of this development should not be underestimated3: following the HRA, 
domestic courts are required to mediate between one party’s right to respect for privacy4 
under Article 8 and another party’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10. 
Accordingly, the balancing of Articles 8 and 10 has become an integral part of the “misuse of 
private information” construct, which requires consideration, firstly, of whether the 
claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the subject-matter in 
question, having regard to Article 8; and, secondly, whether the balancing of Articles 8 and 
10 come down in favour of protection of this privacy or in favour of publication of the 
information?5  As the legal environment attests, the law in this area has developed in a 
largely sporadic fashion6 and, although there have been considerable developments, 
doctrinal uncertainties remain7.  Technological advancement has complicated the issue 
because of the perception that it is now “either impossible or extremely costly for 
individuals to protect the same level of privacy that was once enjoyed”8.  Wacks has noted 
that “Hardly a day passes without yet another onslaught on our privacy.  Most conspicuous, 
of course, is the susceptibility of personal information online to myriad forms of abuse9. It is, 
indeed, well known that, since individuals increasingly use the internet to communicate 
                                                          
1 Senior Lecturer, Kingston University Law School 
2 See Lord Bingham in: Bingham, T "‘Should there be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy?." European 
Human Rights Law Review 450 (1996) 
3 Warby, M, Moreham, N and Christie, I (eds) and Hon Tugendhat M (Consultant Editor), The Law of Privacy 
and The Media (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2011) 36. 
4 The fact that Article 8(1) affords a right to respect for privacy rather than an absolute right has been 
emphasised in case law including M v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 AC 91 
(Lord Walker), R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 AC 307 (Lord 
Bingham) and R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, [2010] 1 WLR 123 
(Laws LJ). Extrajudicially, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury has argued that “Re-reading Article 8, what you see is 
that it’s the right to respect for privacy, rather than a right to privacy per se that is enshrined”.  Lord Neuberger 
of Abbotsbury, ‘Privacy and freedom of expression - a delicate balance’ (Eton, 28 April 2010), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2010/speech-lord-neuberger-29052010. 
5 See Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 499 (QB), [2002] EMLR 30. 
6 See re JR38 [2015] UKSC 42, [2015] 3 WLR 155, which reiterated that the protection of privacy under Article 8 
ECHR can often be entirely dependent upon reasonable expectations in relation to those rights (even, as here, 
where the person claiming an infringement under Article 8 ECHR was a child). 
7 See below. 
8 Gavison R, ‘Privacy and the limits of the law’, (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, in Schoeman, F (ed), 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy  : An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 376.  
9 Wacks, R, “Privacy and Media Freedoms” (OUP 2013) 1 
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private information, the issue of privacy is bound to become more acute as this type of 
communicating continues to expand10, not least because “privacy is not a simple matter, 
especially online privacy…”11 Despite this, whilst recognising “that the enforcement of law 
and regulation online is problematic”, in his report on the ethics of the press, Lord Justice 
Leveson shied away from deliberating on such issues, limiting only a handful of the report’s 
2000 pages to this topic12.  The relationship, then, between privacy concerns, privacy 
behaviours and legal regulation is, therefore, a complex one. This paper attempts to unravel 
the relationship13.  It is premised on the belief that online privacy has increased in 
importance because online communicating has become a social norm that requires not to 
be ignored. It therefore argues that privacy is intrinsically shaped by new communications 
media and the framework that seeks to protect it must appreciate the pervasiveness and 
very mechanics of online communications.  In pursuit of its aims, this paper applies 
behavioural analysis in order to understand why people regularly overshare online and 
evaluates whether, since individuals continue to disclose and trade private information 
online, the concept of privacy has become superfluous.  Accordingly, the “privacy paradox” 
is reasoned and a future privacy path, which allows for the award of a range of mandated 
discursive remedies, is explored.  
Behavioural analysis  
Nissenbaum suggests that online postings have come to be viewed by vast numbers of 
internet users as “mutual proxies for personal diaries”14 and it is certainly the case that the 
internet is an attractive medium on which to communicate even the most private of 
information15.  Users therefore regularly broadcast the minutiae of their lives and share it in 
blogs, status updates, tweets and the like16. Analysis of the behavioural aspects behind this 
trend are useful for two reasons – firstly because this informs debate about how we, as 
individuals, control the gathering and disclosure of our personal information17 and secondly 
for demonstrating the ways in which the very dynamics and pervasiveness of new 
communications media have impacted the privacy landscape.  This latter issue forms the 
context in which the subsequent section on “privacy paradox” is located.  
                                                          
10 Introna, L, ‘Privacy and the Computer: Why We Need Privacy in the Information Society’  (1997) 28(3) 
Metaphilosophy 259, 271. 
11 Edwards, L, ‘Privacy and Data Protection Online : The Laws Don’t Work’ in Edwards, L and Waelde, C (eds), 
Law and the Internet (3rd edition, Hart Publishing, 2009) 443. 
12 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry Into The Culture, Practices And Ethics Of The Press (HC 780 I-IV, November 
2012), para. 7.1.  In the Report itself, only paras. 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 (detailing the types of publishers that 
might be able to join the proposed self-regulatory scheme) and para. 6.20 (detailing to whom any regulatory 
provision should apply) directly discuss the emerging reality of new communications media. 
13 Matters pertaining to privacy-enhancing technology fall outside the scope of this paper.  
14 Nissenbaum, H Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University 
Press, 2009) 60. 
15 The House of Lords Select Committee on Communications 1st Report of Session 2014-15, Social media and 
criminal offences, HL paper 37, TSO 2014, at p.7, estimated that 1.2 billion people regularly use Facebook, 34 
million of them in the UK; 255 million regularly use Twitter, 15 million of them in the UK. 
16 Sellars, S, ‘Online privacy: do we have it and do we want it? A review of the risks and UK case law’ (2011) 
33(1) European Intellectual Property Review 9, 10. 
17 For information privacy in general, see Westin, A, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967) 7 and Raab, C and 
Goold, B, Protecting Information Privacy (Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 69, 2011), 
5.  
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In relation to the first point, one of the most advocated reasons as to why individuals may 
be agreeable to revealing information online is that users do not fully appreciate the 
consequences of their postings nor the size of the audience accessing their content18. This is 
tied in with the erroneous presumption that online behaviour, since it is among digital 
“friends”, is private19.  Hence, the sense of intimacy created by the very mechanics of online 
forums often leads to an over-sharing of information20.  Ellison et al argue that the main 
purpose of participating in social networks is the exchange of highly personal information 
and the maintenance and expansion of one’s social relationships and that it is in fulfilment 
of these continued connections that individuals are prepared to trade private information 
online in return for something else of equal or better value21. The popularity of online 
communicating can, therefore, in part be attributed to a variety of beneficial outcomes 
associated with one’s social capital22.  As Sellars argues, examples include a user allowing 
hundreds of potential online strangers to view a social networking profile in exchange for a 
glimpse of another users’ holiday photographs, with the result that “there is an increasing 
trend for privacy to be viewed as a bargaining chip rather than as a brick wall around your 
private life”23. In online forums, users actively disclose information because it is often 
regarded as being akin to currency and hence is readily traded in exchange for the latest 
technological service24.   
Whatever the impetus behind this gathering trend, it is clear that vast amounts of private 
information, about self and others, are, therefore, being accumulated in online forums and 
particularly on Social Networking Sites (SNSs).  Since these are effectively public spaces, 
“much like the public road”25, this over-sharing makes it increasingly difficult for individuals 
to exert control over the gathering and disclosure of their personal information online once 
they have posted it.  This has led to a number of high profile court cases.  By way of 
example, in the Applause Stores26 case, a user was ordered to pay damages for misuse of 
private information and libel following the creation of a false profile of the claimant on 
Facebook.   Similarly, in Contostavlos v Mendahun27, which also involved misuse of private 
                                                          
18 Hogben, G, ‘Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks’, The European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), Position Paper No. 1(2007), 6.  Available at 
www.ifap.ru/library/book227.pdf  (last accessed 26 June 2015). 
19 Trepte S and Reinecke L, ‘The Social Web as a Shelter for Privacy and Authentic Living’ in Trepte and 
Reinecke, (eds), Privacy Online : Perspectives on Privacy and Self-Disclosure in the Social Web (Springer, 2011), 
at 65. 
20 Hogben, G, op. cit, n. 18.   
21 Ellison, N et al, ‘Negotiating Privacy Concerns and Social Capital Needs in a Social Media Environment’ in 
Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., n. 19, at 20. 
22 There are other forms of capital in addition to social capital : see Bourdieu, P  ‘The Forms of Capital’, in 
Lauder, H, Brown, P, Dillabough, J-A and Halsey A H, (eds) Education, Globalization and Social Change (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 105-118. 
23 Sellars, S, ‘Online privacy: do we have it and do we want it? A review of the risks and UK case law’ (2011) 
33(1) European Intellectual Property Review 9, 10. 
24 Z. Papacharissi and P. Gigson “Fifteen Minutes of Privacy: Privacy, Sociality, and Publicity on Social Network 
Sites” in Trepte and Reinecke, op. cit., n. 19, at 84. 
25 Kelleher D, ‘Social networking, privacy and the future of news’ (2011) 46 Irish Jurist 191, 193. 
26 Applause Store Productions Limited, Matthew Firsht v Grant Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB), [2008] Info. 
TLR 318 [69]. 
27 Contostavlos v Mendahun [2012] EWHC 850    
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information, the claimant obtained an interim injunction to prevent the publication of a “sex 
tape” which had become available on the internet.  The growing body of case law confirms 
that the increasing usage of social media to disclose personal information has implications 
for the privacy of the person(s) to whom the material relates28.  Wacks, moreover, asserts 
that recent advances in the power of computers have been decried as the nemesis of 
whatever vestiges of our privacy still survive29.   This begs a subsequent analysis of whether, 
since it has become a social norm to post private information online, the concept of privacy 
has become superfluous and this issue is addressed below. 
Privacy Paradox  
Coined by Barnes, in 200630, the “privacy paradox” describes the relationship between 
individuals’ intentions to disclose personal information and their actual personal 
information disclosure behaviours31 and illustrates that, despite expressing a concern about 
privacy, people often do very little to protect themselves. Such people, particularly in the 
context of online communications, appear to want and value privacy, yet simultaneously 
appear not to value or want it at all32.  The paradox therefore affirms that privacy concerns 
do not sufficiently explain privacy behaviours in this forum33. The paradox has been well-
documented in literature, with “researchers consistently finding a contradiction between 
the privacy concerns that users express and their disclosure of personal information on 
SNSs”34.  Based on their empirical evidence35, Dienlin and Trepte  recently sought to 
evaluate whether the privacy paradox is now a relic of the past or whether it still exists36.  
Their conclusion is that the behaviours of SNS users are not as paradoxical as was once 
believed.  However, the hypothesis remains relevant as long as both privacy concerns and 
privacy attitudes in relation to it are considered.  In essence, then, the culture, custom and 
practice of users and their online behaviours should be included when evaluating the 
longevity of the paradox.   
Scholars have long-argued that technological advancement has made it either impossible or 
extremely costly for individuals to protect the same level of privacy that was once enjoyed37 
and that, in an age of digital media, we do not really have any privacy.  Sellars, for example, 
has doubted whether a value of online privacy exists at all given the propensity for privacy 
                                                          
28 This is often not the poster him/herself, but another party, as both Applause Stores and Contostavlos 
illustrate. 
29 Wacks, R “Privacy and Media Freedoms” (OUP 2013) 192 
30 Barnes, S B, ‘A privacy paradox: Social networking in the United States’, First Monday, 11(9) (2006), available 
at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/%20view/1394/%201312, last accessed 26 June 2015. 
31 See also, Norberg, P, Horne, D. R and Horne, D. A, “The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure 
Intentions versus Behaviors”, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2007, 100. 
32 Nissenbaum, H Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University 
Press, 2009) 104. 
33 Dienlin, T and Trepte, S, “Is the privacy paradox a relic of the past? An in-depth analysis of privacy attitudes 
and privacy behaviors”, European Journal of Social Psychology (2014). 
34 Young, A and Quan-Haase, A, “Privacy Protection Strategies On Facebook”, Information, Communication & 
Society, 16:4, 2013, 479-500, 481. 
35 The formation of an online questionnaire with 595 respondents. 
36 Dienlin, T and Trepte, S, op. cit, n. 33.  
37 Gavison R, ‘Privacy and the limits of the law’, (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, in Schoeman, F (ed), 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy  : An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 376.  
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rights to be habitually traded38.  Edwards, too, has posited that technology represents the 
most serious current threat to privacy39 and that it is declining in significance40.  Certainly, it 
may be argued that the trading of privacy rights by one individual will have consequences 
for all users since if one individual waives his or her rights, the level of privacy for all 
individuals ultimately decreases41.  This is because, as Westin articulates, “self-invasion” 
from “those who tell all” prompts others to “ask all”42. However, that many users willingly 
post private information or are prepared to trade it by signing up to the latest online service 
is not the same as saying that they do not care about privacy or that privacy is any less 
important in this forum than it is offline. What it does suggest is that individuals need to 
work harder to retain their privacy and that privacy may not have a uniform value but, 
instead, reflects subjective societal sensitivities and perceptions, whichties in with Dienlin 
and Trepte’s recent findings.  Accordingly, it may be argued that, as a consequence of the 
fact that privacy is constantly being chipped away at online, and is therefore harder to 
protect, individuals appreciate it more. On this argument, individuals are becoming more 
aware of their privacy, and its value, than they used to be43. 
The legal framework that seeks to protect privacy must, therefore, be fit for purpose in a 
technological age, being able, for example, to adequately process try to accommodate the 
types of communication that are often prevalent online. Of particular concern is posted 
trivia because there are arguably specific problems with demarcating this type of 
information for misuse of private information purposes, which emphasises reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  In respect of trivial information, this might represent material over 
which a claimant could have a reasonable expectation of privacy.  In Axel Springer AG v 
Germany44, the Grand Chamber determined that the concept of private life was a broad 
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition, covering the physical and psychological 
integrity of a person and could “therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s identity, 
such as gender identification and sexual orientation, name or elements relating to a 
person’s right to their image”45 and there is evidence to suggest that domestic courts have 
taken a lax approach to the protection of what might be construed as “trivial information”.  
For example, in Applause Stores, a person's date of birth represented a matter over which a 
claimant was found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy46.  However, this approach 
to analysing information of a trivial nature is arguably overly broad and, hence, flawed47.  
                                                          
38 Sellars, S, ‘Online privacy: do we have it and do we want it? A review of the risks and UK case law’ (2011) 
33(1) European Intellectual Property Review 9, 16. 
39 Edwards, L, ‘Consumer Privacy, Online Business and The Internet: Looking for privacy in all the wrong places’ 
2003 11(3) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 226, 227. 
40 Edwards, L, ‘Privacy and Data Protection Online : The Laws Don’t Work’ in Edwards, L and Waelde, C (eds), 
Law and the Internet (3rd edition, Hart Publishing, 2009) 444. 
41 Kleinman, Z, ‘How online life distorts privacy rights for all’, bbc news, 8 January 2010, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8446649.stm, accessed 8 February, 2011 
42 Westin, A, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967) 52. 
43 Jarvis, J, Public Parts : How Sharing in the Digital Age Improves the Way We Work and Live (Simon and 
Schuster, 2011) 102. 
44 Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6 
45 ibid, 83. 
46 op. cit, n. 26.  
47 Bennett, T, ‘Horizontality's new horizons - re-examining horizontal effect: privacy, defamation and the 
Human Rights Act: Part 1’ (2010) 21(3) Entertainment Law Review 96, 103 
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Accordingly, what follows is a suggestion as to how a claimant might achieve vindication 
following a privacy violation without access to the courts.     
Discursive remedies 
In awarding damages for misuse of private information, our domestic courts have placed 
emphasis on the objective severity of the privacy violation suffered by the claimant in this 
area48.  Monetary awards have been typified by non-pecuniary losses by way of injury to 
feelings and mental distress49 and there is an observed absence of claims for pecuniary 
losses50.  In his determination, Eady J identified that, as with other awards of damages, 
those in respect of privacy violation require to be proportionate to the harm done and must 
not be arbitrary51. Thus, in Mosley, Eady J’s reasoning suggests that quantification should be 
on the basis of selecting an amount “which marks the fact that an unlawful intrusion has 
taken place while affording some degree of solatium to the injured party. That is all that can 
be done in circumstances where the traditional object of restitutio is not available. At the 
same time, the figure selected should not be such that it could be interpreted as minimising 
the scale of the wrong done or the damage it has caused” 52.  Eady J himself emphasised the 
unsatisfactory level of the amount awarded, opining that “no amount of damages can fully 
compensate the Claimant for the damage done.  He is hardly exaggerating when he says 
that his life was ruined.  What can be achieved by a monetary award in the circumstances is 
limited”53. Gavison has commented that “For the genuine victim of a loss of privacy, 
damages and even injunctions are remedies of despair.  A broken relationship, ... acute 
feelings of shame and degradation, cannot be undone through money damages. The only 
benefit may be a sense of vindication, and not all victims of invasions of privacy feel 
sufficiently strongly to seek such redress”54. This observation is particularly pertinent when 
what is being complained of is relatively trivial, though personal, information (and it should 
be borne in mind that what may be trivia to one person is another person’s important 
information55).  Given the relative ease with which users are able to post this type of 
information about themselves, and others, online, it is arguable that, in the interests of the 
latter individuals, we require a quick process that would give a degree of vindication without 
having to go through the courts.   My proposal is that a distinct range of mandated 
discursive remedies, such as corrections, retractions, and rights of reply published with due 
prominence, could be the answer here.  This builds on a stance adopted by Mullis and 
                                                          
48 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20.  See, for discussion, 
Witzleb, N ‘Justifying gain-based remedies for invasions of privacy’ (2009) 29(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
325, 349. 
49 McGregor, H, McGregor on Damages (18th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 2009) 42-003 and 3-011.  
50 The basis for attaching exemplary damages for claims in misuse of private information was considered at 
length in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), with Eady J ultimately determining 
[197] that a plea for exemplary damages was inadmissible and, in Mosley v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 30, it was 
determined that punitive awards would run the risk of being incompatible with Article 10. 
51 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20 [214] and [229].   
52 ibid [231]. 
53 ibid [236]. 
54 Gavison, R, ‘Privacy and the limits of the law’, (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, in Schoeman, F (ed), 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 371-372. 
55 See, e.g., the decision in Hatton v United Kingdom App 36022/97 (2002) 34 EHRR 37 which concerned sleep 
disturbance.   
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Scott56, who posit that the law in relation to defamation (as opposed to privacy) would be 
enhanced by their utilisation.  Such remedies are not unknown in defamation law, being 
available under Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1996 on the summary disposal of a claim 
under Section 857.  Pursuant to Section 9(1), a claimant may obtain such of the following as 
may be appropriate: 
 
(a) a declaration that the statement of which he complains was false and defamatory; 
(b) an order that the defendant publish or cause to be published a suitable correction and 
apology; 
(c) damages not exceeding £10,000; and 
(d) an order restraining the defendant from publishing or further publishing the matter 
complained of58.   
However, the Defamation Act 2013 has not progressed discursive remedies further.  Mullis 
and Scott lament this by observing that, despite the aptitude of discursive remedies in the 
context of online communications, the current defamation legislation shows a 
parliamentary failing “to … highlight that the veracity of even highly defamatory internet 
articles and postings had been contested”59.   
 
Given that much of the content of online postings can be of a trivial nature and such 
postings may often include a defamatory element60, there is arguably a case for evaluating 
whether a part could to be played by such remedies in respect of online privacy violation. To 
an extent, this is already allowed for.  Discursive remedies in the form of an apology are 
allowed for under Clause 1(ii) of The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) 
Editors’ Code and IPSO has power to direct the prominence of a correction in respect of 
inaccurate information.  IPSO, for example, recently forced The Times newspaper to publish 
a reference to a correction on its front page61.  However, privacy scholars have not 
traditionally incorporated discursive remedies within future visions of domestic privacy 
protection – Raymond Wacks, for example, asserts that court-ordered apologies should be 
disregarded when evaluating privacy protection going forward, although there is little 
explanation as to why this should be the case62.  
                                                          
56 Mullis, A and Scott, A, ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013’, The Modern Law Review (2014) 77(1), 
87 and Mullis, A and Scott, A, ‘Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously and Where It Leads’ (2012) 63(1) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 5.  
57 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others [2001] EWCA Civ 1805, [2002] QB 783 [90]-[91]. 
58 Defamation Act 1996, Section 9(1). 
59 Mullis, A and Scott, A, ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013’, The Modern Law Review (2014) 77(1), 
107. 
60 Jordan, B, ‘Case Comment : Applause Store Productions Ltd v Grant Raphael’, Entertainment 
Law Review 2009, 20(2), 60-61. 
61 See “Times is first paper forced by Ipso to highlight correction on front page”, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/19/times-is-first-paper-forced-by-ipso-to-highlight-correction-
on-front-page, last accessed 25 June 2015. 
62 Wacks, R, “Privacy and Media Freedoms” (OUP 2013) 258. 
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Whilst it is to be acknowledged that there are problems with finding a fit for discursive 
remedies in relation to privacy violation (see below), certain opportunities do present 
themselves.  For example, given that the award of a discursive remedy would ensure that 
the public was aware of the errors contained in a publication63, it is straightforward to argue 
that such remedies might have particular application in instances where the private 
information revealed in a post is partly untrue.   Not only would this not defeat the claim 
being heard in respect of privacy violation64, but, in those instances where the essence of a 
privacy violation claim is to set a false record straight, a discursive remedy, such as an 
apology or retraction posted with due prominence by the online service provider, might 
achieve the type of vindication that Gavison refers to above. 
 
However, whilst such a resolution might satisfy those who have been the victims of 
inaccuracy, it cannot make private information private once again. This is because “[o]nce a 
private fact has been made public it is difficult for further action by the defendant to 
mitigate the damage caused to the claimant by the disclosure.  Although contrition by a 
defendant may reduce the hurt to the claimant’s feelings to some degree, an apology for 
the publication of the private information is not the same as an apology for a libel.  
Depending on the circumstances, an apology in the former case may be incapable of 
providing anything approaching the consolation that an apology and retraction would afford 
in the case of a libel.  A reputation can be vindicated, but once a private fact is known it 
cannot be removed from the public domain by further publication… Gratuitous further 
reference to the disclosures might even make matters worse”.65  In defamation, where the 
contested information is proven to be false, a claimant may receive vindication following a 
public declaration of the falsity of the information.  Vindication may be achieved in such 
circumstances by challenging a falsehood without demanding damages66.  In 2008, for 
example, author Salman Rushdie won a libel case in respect of various allegations but 
decided not to claim damages, content with a declaration of falsity67. Since the essence of a 
libel claim is that the allegations were untrue, the authoritative finding by a court of their 
falsity largely restores a damaged reputation68 (although others might find damages more 
attractive).   
Ultimately, it is in respect of truthful private information that it is to be acknowledged that 
there are fundamental problems with extending Mullis and Scott’s hypothesis. Whilst a 
retraction or withdrawal might be available in respect of such information, the discerning 
reader would be likely to notice the absence of a declaration that the information was 
untrue and this would invariably lead to conclusions being drawn relating to the truth of the 
observation.  However, this shortcoming may be addressed in the actual structuring of the 
remedy itself. For example, one might envisage a stripped down procedure in which the 
                                                          
63 Mullis, A and Scott, A, ‘Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously and Where It Leads’ (2012) 63(1) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 5, 20. 
64 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 [86].  
65 Warby, M, Moreham, N and Christie, I (eds) and Tugendhat Hon M (Consultant Editor), The Law of Privacy 
and The Media (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2011) 675-676. 
66 Pidd H, ‘Rushdie Wins Apology – and Spurns Cash – in Libel Case’ The Guardian, 27 August 2008.   
67 ibid. 
68 Phillipson, G, ‘Max Mosley goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant Notification and Interim Injunctions (2009) 
1(1) Journal of Media Law 73, 74-75. 
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remedy available was a discursive one, such as a statement of retraction that was required 
to be put up by the online service provider.  This could automatically appear following a 
search of the prohibited material and might be a statement such as "Material has been 
removed from this page because it violated the law", with an appropriate apology, but 
without the option of obtaining a declaration of falsity. Under such an approach, it is 
conceivable that a claim in privacy violation could be heard, not by a court, but, instead, by 
an authorised body or ombudsman.  For a claim to be made, the claimant would need to 
prove that the private information complained of had been communicated, but the claimant 
would not be allowed to prove that the information was false. The remedy would lie solely 
in the securing of a statement of retraction with an appropriate apology. Since there would 
be no other remedy available, this would overcome any concern that the absence of an 
admission that the information was false would be interpreted as confirmation that it was 
true: the absence of such a statement would be simply a consequence of the fact that it was 
not available under the streamlined action69.  
In conclusion, therefore, there is merit in further exploring the part that could be played by 
discursive remedies in the future protection of privacy.   It is notable, for example, that, in 
the Applause Stores case, the court recognised that “[H]ad the defendant apologised at an 
early stage, [the claimant] would have accepted that apology and avoided going through the 
stress and expense of litigation”70.  Accordingly, such remedies, particularly in their 
streamlined form and in relation to trivial material, could be a broadly effective measure in 
the armoury of privacy protection without requiring a determination by a court.  Given the 
increased emphasis placed on privacy in a technological age, the inclusion of streamlined 
discursive remedies adds value to an already hotly contested debate. 
                                                          
69 The landscape is also complicated by the recent EU Court of Justice ruling  in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, 
Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (OJ C 212/4, 13 May 2014) that there exists a 
‘right to be forgotten’ which enables individuals to compel search engine operators to ensure certain data are 
not shown in search results made using that individual’s name.  See, further, González Fuster, G, “Fighting For 
Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal 
Data Protection” Birkbeck Law Review 2014 2(2) 
70 Applause Store Productions Limited, Matthew Firsht v Grant Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB), [2008] Info. 
TLR 318 [69]. 
